A SLAPP on the wrist for Arka Wealth as High Court rejects defamation claim

The High Court’s decision in Kamal v Tax Policy Associates [2026] EWHC 551 (KB) has attracted considerable attention as the first judicial application of the UK’s statutory response to “strategic lawsuits against public participation” (SLAPPs) introduced by the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (the 2023 Act).

Background

The case arose from an article written by high-profile tax lawyer, Dan Neidle, and published by Tax Policy Associates, entitled “TikTok tax avoidance from Arka Wealth: why the Government and the Bar should act.” The article criticised a tax avoidance structure promoted by Arka Wealth and associated with the UK tax barrister, Setu Kamal, describing the promotion as “nonsense”. In response, Kamal brought a claim in libel and malicious falsehood, seeking substantial damages and the removal of the article. The High Court ultimately rejected the claim and considered whether it constituted a SLAPP under the 2023 Act, marking the first time the new statutory provisions have been tested out in court.

The statutory SLAPP regime

The statutory framework introduced by the 2023 Act reflects growing concern about the use of litigation to suppress public-interest reporting.

A claim may be characterised as a SLAPP if three conditions are met:

The conduct has, or is intended to have, the effect of restraining the defendant’s exercise of the right to freedom of speech.
The speech concerns information relating to economic crime.
The claim is published for a purpose relating to the public interest in combating such crime. Crucially, the statute also requires that the claimant’s behaviour was intended to cause harassment, expense, or other harm to the defendant beyond that ordinarily encountered in properly conducted litigation.

Stage one

In considering the first element of the statutory test, the Court examined the concept of freedom of speech under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular the right to impart information, ideas, or opinions through speech, writing, or images. The statute provides that any legal limitations on the exercise of that right ought to be ignored when determining whether a claim restrains freedom of speech.

This means that the court focuses on the nature of the proceedings rather than the nature of the speech. One example would be a defamatory statement, for example of fraud. If the statements might amount to hate speech, or encouraging terrorism, and the proceedings were an attempt to restrain that speech, the court must set that aside.

As recognised by the Court, this avoids a circular argument whereby a claimant could defeat a SLAPP allegation simply by asserting that the speech in issue is unlawful. Instead, the analysis proceeds on the basis that even speech which may ultimately be found to be unlawful still falls within the scope of “freedom of speech” for the purposes of the statutory test. Once this approach was applied, s195(1)(a) was inevitably satisfied in this case.

Stage two

Turning to the second stage of the statutory test, under s195(1)(b), the Court assessed whether the information contained in the article related to economic crime. The defendants argued that the article concerned conduct potentially amounting to offences such as cheating the public revenue or facilitating tax evasion, both of which are included within the statutory definition of economic crime. The legislation does not require proof that an offence has actually occurred; it is enough that the defendant reasonably believed the information to be evidence of such conduct and that publication would facilitate an investigation into that possibility. According to Neidle, his thorough investigation into the tax avoidance structure found it to be ineffective, with the potential to lead clients into dishonest non-disclosure. He therefore believed that publishing his analysis could prompt investigation by HMRC. This evidence was not challenged by Kamal, and as such, was accepted by the Court.

Stage three

Public interest

The Court then considered whether one purpose of the article being published related to the public interest in combating economic crime. In the article itself, Neidle called for regulatory scrutiny and urged HMRC to investigate the scheme and take action against its promoters. In light of this, and Neidle’s unchallenged evidence that one of his motivations was to encourage investigation and regulatory action, the Court concluded that this requirement was also satisfied.

Intention to cause harm

The final component of the statutory definition concerns a subjective assessment of the claimant’s behaviour, which, under section 195(1)(d), should be intended to cause the defendant harassment, distress, expense, or other harm beyond what is ordinarily encountered in properly conducted litigation. The Court ultimately concluded that Kamal’s behaviour met this test, finding that it had a “chilling effect” on Neidle’s journalism.

Wider reform?

Stepping back to look at the broader context of this case highlights why these provisions were introduced. Defending a defamation claim is highly complex and can lead to hundreds of thousands of pounds of legal fees, therefore acting as a strong deterrent to investigative journalism. This outcome will undoubtedly be viewed as a crucial development in the UK’s response to SLAPP litigation.

However, recent political developments indicate a push towards expanding the current framework beyond reporting connected to economic crime. The so-called “Mandelson scandal” has renewed calls for stronger anti-SLAPP protections, urging the Government to include further crackdown on SLAPPs in this year’s King’s Speech in order to expand the regime beyond financial offences. It remains to be seen what action, if any, the government will take in response.

Click here to read the full judgment.

If you have any questions, please contact a member of our Defamation and Reputation Management team.

This article was co-authored by Trainee Eva Curran.

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